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This article explores regional integration projects in the global South and constraints upon 
them. Its focus is on the use of economic sociology of law as a methodological approach 
through which to rethink the relationship between law, markets and state – and to explore 
how these interact in the context of one regionalisation project (the European Union) as well 
as interrogating whether economic sociology can similarly cast light on another 
regionalisation project (the African Union). The article examines the role of the ‘social state’ 
and of labour market institutions as part of an array of adjustment mechanisms responding 
to the liberalisation of trade and the opening of national borders: to what extent can social 
law and social rights mediate the operation of markets, and what does this mean when 









This article examines what space there can be for labour law and social rights in projects of 
regional integration, a question I have previously examined in the context of the European 
Union (EU) and now also increasingly in the context of the African Union (AU). It explores 
how the normative mission at the centre of the labour law project, seeking to use law to 
govern and ameliorate markets, can be realised by thinking through different institutions, 
which emerge from and are applicable to the global South as well as the global North, and 
which don’t presuppose formal labour relations or broad capacities of the state. 
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To do that, the article is interested in three areas of contestation. The first, overarching, 
question is how can we better conceptualise the relationship between economy, society and 
law? The objective here is not to compare regions, the AU with the EU, as such. Rather, the 
aim is to interrogate the utility which accounts of the interaction between markets and 
(social) law, of notions such as ‘embeddedness’ and ‘social regionalism’ which have been 
developed for and applied in the context of the global North, can have in other contexts, 
including that of the AU. Second: of the many differences between the two regional 
integration projects of the EU and AU, this article focuses on conceptualisations of 
development: where their constituent member states are located on the ‘path’ towards 
economic development and how one defines development. Third: the article interrogates the 
related issue of the extent to which and the terms on which the constituent states are 
integrated into global trade, the narratives within orthodox economics about how trade 
works and the role of law in this.  
 
Accordingly, to return to the overarching theme of the article, the insights which may have 
been pertinent to understanding the relationship between the economy/market on the one 
hand, and the state/region on the other developed in the context of industrialised economies 
of the global North and applied to the EU, may have less purchase in the context of the AU. 
This leads to a turn to a more contextualised study of the economy and markets. In doing so, 
the article draws upon the methodological approach and insights offered by ‘economic 
sociology of law’, the use of sociological approaches (empirical, normative, analytical) to 
investigate relationships between (labour) law and economy. Defined by Sabine Frerichs 
(2012) as an academic venture located in the middle of the social sciences, economic 
sociology of law ‘is not to be understood as an overspecialized approach, which dissects legal, 
economic, and social aspects and focuses on the smallest possible subset only, but as an 
integrative effort in reconnecting law, economy, and society, both as spheres of reality and as 
fields of scholarly interest’. 
 
My interest is thus to map ways in which markets and trade liberalisation have been 
embedded within one example of regional economic integration (the European Union), in 
order to examine the wider significance of an economic sociology of law analysis – at a 
different historical time, with reference to the South rather than the North, and against the 
backdrop of a changed global economic order. More specifically, I investigate the 
ameliorative potential of regional collective action by developing states, which are 




ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF LAW AND THE EU INTEGRATION PROJECT 
 
In attempting to understand the relationship between social rights and markets and the role 
for social rights in the operation of markets, this article engages with and also seeks to go 
beyond Polanyi’s concept of embeddedness (1944). Much neoclassical or even new 
institutional thinking on regulation is, for the most part, premised on an opposition between 
‘market’ and ‘regulation’ or ‘market’ and ‘state’. Neoliberal ideology, in particular, is founded 
on a belief in the legitimacy of markets, and ‘[t]o establish this legitimacy, neo-liberals treat 
markets, usually without explicit acknowledgement, as existing outside society and outside 
history. “The market” is simply ‘there’ (MacEwan, 1999: 11). As Granovetter (1985: 505) 
shows, even the new institutionalist version of neoclassical economics ‘deflect[s] the analysis 
of institutions from sociological, historical, and legal argumentation and show[s] instead that 
they arise as the efficient solution to economic problems’. If one accepts the thesis that the 
market ‘emerged naturally’, then state action is seen as an added extra – as an exogenous 
interference in the workings of the market. 
 
Scholarship within the field of economic sociology has done much to illuminate the 
implications for thinking about law which follow from the recognition that markets do not 
exist in a ‘state of nature’. Drawing upon the work of Polanyi, the tradition of economic 
sociology challenges the idea that markets are a separate realm, instead arguing that they are 
embedded in social relations (Block, 1990: 23). From a socio-legal perspective, rather than 
being natural phenomena, markets are understood to be social constructs, constituted by law 
and social norms. Polanyi’s primary intuition that economies are enmeshed or embedded 
within non-economic institutions is a helpful one.1 They are thus not autonomous or self-
regulating as classical economic theory suggests, but located within a web of institutions, 
politics, social relations. What Polanyi refers to as the counter-movement relates to a 
political, regulatory response to the ‘freeing’ of markets: the forces of laissez-faire economic 
liberalism are offset by principles of social protection.2 
 
What is noteworthy about the economic sociology approach is the assertion of the 
importance of state action and social relations not only in terms of the counter-movement, 
but also as constitutive of markets and essential for ‘productive organization’. By this Polanyi 
meant not only in the establishment of rules to enforce contract and protect property rights, 
but further, in the protection of society from market liberalism by anchoring markets within 
institutional regulation (Beckert, 2007: 8). Hence statements such as ‘[l]aissez-faire was 
planned’ and ‘[e]ven free trade and competition required intervention to be workable’ 
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(Polanyi, 1944: 147 and 156). The notion of a ‘self-regulating’ market is, he emphasises, 
utopian. 
 
There are at least two meanings of ‘embeddedness’ at play in Polanyi’s thought.3 On the one 
hand, the term is used to mean that all economies, and economic behaviour, are enmeshed in 
non-economic institutions; the constructedness of markets is a given in Polanyi, in contrast 
to their supposed naturalness. On the other hand, there is the idea that embeddedness alters 
from one economic system to another; that whilst it is not possible to fully disembed the 
economy from the rest of society, there are differences in the degree of enmeshment.  In my 
view, these two conceptualisations are reconcilable. The instinct that prompts one to reject 
the orthodox account of the rise of the self-regulating market as a utopian project, surely 
makes it difficult to conceive of markets as being entirely disembedded. I think the primary 
intuition about embeddedness is a helpful one, whilst cognisant of the difficulties with this 
approach to the relationship between market and society. These include, primarily: the 
criticism made by Viviana Zelizer and others, of the Polanyian distinction between the 
embedded and disembedded economy (Steiner, 2009); the argument that embeddedness 
does not go far enough in debunking standard economic models (Zelizer, 2012: 148); and the 
concern about the way in which the language of embeddedness conjures up an image of 
separate spheres or systems: with ‘markets’ as asocial and separate from ‘society’, and with 
the two somehow communicating with each other, rather than being co-constitutive. In truth, 
many neo-Polanyians refer to the idea of the ‘always embedded market’ (see Barber, 1995: 
400). So, the notion of embeddedness does not speak to the specific characteristics of 
modern capitalist economies, or to the specificity of market organisation (Beckert, 2007: 19). 
Drawing together Polanyi’s use of embeddedness with the insights of the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ literature (Rogers Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997; Hall and Soskice, 2001) Block 
(2003: 299-300) points to how different market societies are embedded within diverse 
matrices of ideas, rules and institutional structures. Ruggie takes this embeddedness 
reasoning further, to examine international regimes, applying Polanyi’s insights to the 
institutional reconstruction of the postwar international economy (1982; 2003). For Ruggie, 
the essence of the embedded liberal compromise is the formulation of a type of 
multilateralism, one which is predicated on domestic intervention, and which is compatible 
with the requirements of domestic stability (1982: 393, 398, 399). 
 
The contention underpinning this article is that such Polanyian embeddedness can occur at 
the regional as well as at the national level. Through a case study of the European Union, I 
show (Ashiagbor, 2013) that the ‘embedded liberal compromise’ of this regional integration 
project was predicated on the ability of these industrialised nations to embed the market 
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within national institutions of social citizenship - principally labour and social welfare law. 
But this national-level social policy was ultimately shored up by social policy initiatives at EU 
level. 
 
Regional integration within the EU was premised on the existence of background rules at 
national level, institutions of social citizenship to ameliorate the effects of economic 
liberalisation. The drafters of the original European Community treaties considered it 
essential to guarantee free movement of the ‘factors of production’ - goods, persons, services, 
and capital - to attain the perceived economic advantages of integration in general and the 
creation of a single market in particular (Molle, 2006; Weatherill, 2004). Namely: enhanced 
efficiency in production made possible by increased specialisation in accordance with the 
principle of comparative advantage; increased production levels due to better exploitation of 
economies of scale; improved international bargaining positions, made possible by larger 
size, leading to better terms of trade; enforced changes in efficiency brought about by 
intensified competition between firms. In the creation of a common or internal market, 
however, national economies come under pressure to deregulate so as to remain competitive, 
since national capacity to regulate markets is severely reduced due to removal of barriers to 
trade, mobility of capital, and fear of capital flight (see Ashiagbor, 2009). Arguably, states 
may feel pressured to reduce (fiscal, labour or other) regulatory costs in order to keep or to 
attract capital and foreign direct investment. Nevertheless, the orthodoxy was that there was 
no need for labour standards at the European level to balance trade liberalisation within the 
new economic community: domestic welfare states would serve as social stabilisers, to 
counter the effects of the strong liberalisation of the internal market and to maintain social 
cohesion domestically - through mechanisms such as social transfers, public infrastructure 
and labour law. 
 
With regard to these background conditions, Lang refers to the ‘shared commitment to the 
political ideology of embedded liberalism’ in the postwar era, which shaped, for instance, the 
GATT regime and other institutions emerging from the Bretton Woods conference. In 
contrast with today’s laissez-faire liberalism, the dominant philosophy forming the backdrop 
to postwar trade liberalisation and to regional integration between industrialised nations, 
was a recognition that governments should intervene to protect their populations ‘from 
economic instability and insecurity’ and promote their own versions of a welfare state (Lang, 
2011: 29). The institutional reconstruction of the postwar international economy accepted 
that liberalism or trade liberalisation had to be embedded in society (Ruggie, 1982). 
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After its initial ‘hands off’ approach towards social policy, the EU in time evolved a 
supranational social dimension both to protect vulnerable regions, sectors and workers from 
the effects of intra-EU trade liberalisation, and to offer protection against global trade. As 
examples, we have social security and residence rights for Community workers and EU 
citizens. But, further, the EU also developed major redistributive policies - adjustment 
assistance and financial instruments to address economic and social imbalances at EU level, 
in the form of the European structural and investment Funds4 - what one might call an 
example of ‘social regionalism’ (Blackett, 2002). The embedded liberal compromise in the 
EU context principally involved embedding the European internal market within national 
social policy; presupposing the existence and the capacity of the national systems of labour 
law and social welfare law mentioned earlier. The EU sought to shore up working and living 
standards in the face of economic liberalisation, but did so principally by supporting the 
Member States in so doing. Indeed, the social harmonisation which has emerged at EU level 
has never been intended as a replacement for the more substantial social provision assumed 
to exist at national level. The bulk of the burden of financing the social transfers ameliorating 
trade liberalisation falls on the states. 
 
Of course, as far as the EU is concerned this social dimension has to a great extent been 
unravelling in recent years, even prior to the current sovereign debt crisis.5 But the central 
points I wish to raise here, are: first that the EU has illustrated how regional integration can 
complement the efforts by states to protect society from global market forces; it has shown 
the possibility of regionalisation with a strong social dimension. Second, industrialised 
economies of the global North, including those in Europe, undertook an opening to regional 
and then global markets in an era favourable towards embedded liberalism. This applies both 
to the evolution in the protective capacities of individual states of the North during the 
twentieth century and, later, the evolution in the protective capacities of the region. It 
differed from the current era of what might be called resurgent neoliberalism, or what Gill 
(1995) refers to as ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, characterised as it is by market 
fundamentalism. And third, to be explored in more detail below, the ability of these 
industrialised states to embed the market through social transfers and welfare state regimes, 
and the subsequent embedding of the European internal market within national systems, was 
made possible in large part because of transfers from ‘periphery’ to ‘core’: from the global 






PATHS TO DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
This section turns the lens of economic sociology of law, and its integrative effort to 
reconnect law, economy, and society, away from its more familiar focus on the industrialised 
states of the global North, and on to a study of developing states . The questions here relate to 
development, and to the terms on which African states are integrated into global trade. With 
regard to the former, what is the role played by law in the economic development process? Is 
the adoption of formal legal institutions - so long argued to be a precondition for economic 
development more broadly - also a prerequisite for the proper functioning of labour markets 
and employment relations? 
 
Theoretical conceptualisations of ‘development’ (in relation to the causes and determinants 
of major societal and economic change) and the question of how such theories should be put 
into practice, have been in an almost constant state of contestation.6 ‘Development’ is a field, 
and way of understanding the world, which is in a state of flux, with shifting dominance of 
competing approaches. The decades since the 1940s have witnessed transitions and 
competition between structuralist-developmentalist approaches, neo-Marxist dependency 
perspectives, neoliberalism, and more recently the post-Washington consensus eclecticism, 
and human and sustainable development approaches (Desai and Potter, 2014). 
 
Hettne suggests that [‘d]evelopment is one of the oldest and most powerful of all Western 
ideas’ highlighting the hegemonic force of a narrative centred around growth and progress, 
and premised on models emerging from these countries’ own experiences and prejudices 
(Hettne, 1990: 39, 47). This view is at the root of ‘modernisation theory’, a paradigm which 
adopts an evolutionary perspective, predicting the movement of countries from a state of 
underdevelopment, ‘by means of an imitative process, in which the less-developed countries 
gradually assumed the qualities of the industrialized nations’ (Hettne, 1990: 60). Today, the 
development strategies of international development institutions such as the World Bank 
have coalesced around the ‘rule of law’ as the key to transforming developing countries into 
market economies although, as Santos notes (2006: 257) several competing conceptions of 
the ‘rule of law’ might be in play at any one time. 
 
In her account of the troubled evolution of ‘law and development’ or ‘legal development’ 
scholarship and practice, Perry-Kessaris notes what has been identified as the beginnings of a 
(post-modernisation theory, post-neoliberalism) ‘third moment’ in law and development 
among both academics and practitioners (2014: 2). This new approach is characterised by 
‘the new attention to the limits of markets, the effort to define development as freedom not 
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just growth, the stress on the local, the interest in participation, and the focus on poverty 
reduction’ (Trubek and Santos, 2006: 7). However, this ‘new mainstream’ or ‘third moment’ 
within law and development practice does not offer a complete break with earlier periods of 
orthodoxy, in particular those approaches which placed the ‘rule of law’ centre stage in the 
understanding of the development process (Santos, 2006). What is notable about this more 
recent stage in mainstream law and development practice is that it remains marked by a 
(mostly unreconstructed) market fundamentalism, although offering what Kennedy (2006) 
refers to as a ‘chastened neoliberalism’. In contrast, critical law and development scholars 
interrogate and challenge the assumptions which have led new and old mainstream theorists 
and practitioners, especially the international development institutions and other 
transnational actors, to be so dedicated to the notion that particular legal forms and 
institutional frameworks are necessary for economic growth and development. As will be 
seen, identifying (or demystifying) the ‘correct’ forms and institutions required to realise 
economic development, is also an apt focus for the economic sociology of law approach. 
 
The relationship between law, institutions and development is one which preoccupied 
Weber, and indeed a version of Weberian thinking is central to mainstream law and 
development thinking, as is a Hayekian conception of the rule of law. Weber’s observations 
on the central role of ‘rational’ legal systems in the emergence of modern capitalism and on 
economic development more generally have been implicitly and explicitly co-opted by the 
World Bank and other international financial institutions (Santos, 2006: 272-3; Shihata et al, 
1991). According to Weber, one of the most important preconditions for the development of a 
market economy (‘capitalistic enterprise’) was the ‘rationalization and systematization of the 
law in general’, namely the predictability and security gained from a formal legal process 
(1956: 883). In an interpretation which located Weberian thought at the centre of 
development theory, policy and praxis in 20th century USA (Thomas, 2006), but has been 
criticised for simplifying Weber (Cohen et al, 1975; Trubek 1972), Parsons outlined a 
‘modernisation’ theory, which posited that: 
 
(1) there is a universal path towards economic development which features the emergence 
of a highly differentiated social structure; (2) this path features the centrality of free 
market entrepreneurs; and (3) states that wish to succeed in economic development 
should do as much as possible to free constraints on entrepreneurs and investors.7 
 
Parsons’ interpretation of Weber has arguably misapplied Weber’s typology in order to 
develop a universalistic account of economic growth, and placed Weber ‘in the service of a 
particularly American version of capitalism’ (Thomas 2006: 409-410; 416). However, the 
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orthodoxy which took hold has been influential within the international financial institutions, 
feeding into the ‘Washington Consensus’, namely the view that all countries ‘should adapt 
their institutions to a global template based on constitutional guarantees for private property, 
a minimalist state, and the liberalization of trade and capital flows’ (Deakin, 2011). 
 
Both the modernisation theory and the Washington Consensus accord significant priority to 
private law rights, as can be seen in the focus on the formalisation of property rights. But 
what of regulatory law, of the sort which labour lawyers typically advocate? Trubek and 
Santos characterise neoliberal law and development thought as focused primarily on the law 
of the market, with regulation often presented as an unnecessary intrusion on the market, 
and ‘relatively little concern … shown for law as a guarantor of political and civil rights or as 
protector of the weak and disadvantaged’ (Trubek and Santos, 2006: 2). Positing the rule of 
law as a development strategy arguably adopts a reductive view of law. As Kennedy notes 
(2003: 20), such rule of law advocates tend to go beyond seeing the need for ‘minimum 
national institutional functionality’ but rather see the rule of law as a formula to be applied 
wholesale, in a way which makes simplifying assumptions about the form and content of law, 
prioritising formalisation of law and the elimination of ‘corruption’. 
 
Granovetter (1985), argues that orthodox neoclassical economic accounts provide an 
‘undersocialized’ account of economic action, whilst sociology offers an ‘oversocialized’ 
conception. Whilst economic sociology can avoid these two extremes, by applying a 
‘sociological lens’ (Perry-Kessaris, 2014) to economic phenomena, the emerging discipline of 
economic sociology of law can go further, by bridging the intellectual disconnectedness 
between the ‘legal’, ‘economic’, and ‘social’ which is a hallmark of much orthodox thinking 
from the international development institutions. As an example of work in the tradition (if 
not at that time using the language) of economic sociology of law, Perry-Kessaris’ study of the 
relationship between national legal systems and foreign direct investment has shown the 
World Bank’s reliance on the economic approach to be responsible for its overestimation and 
misunderstanding of the role of law as a determinant of foreign investment in Sri Lanka and 
the inaccuracy in its measures of investors’ perceptions and expectations of legal systems 
(Perry-Kessaris, 2013; 2008; 2001). 
 
 
THE STATE, MARKETS AND PATHS TO INDUSTRIALISATION 
 
I want to continue this analysis of ‘development’ by turning now to the terms on which 
African states are integrated into global trade. There are at least two facets of the critique of 
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modernisation theory which are linked: relating to the ‘free trade’ economistic underpinning 
of the theory, and to the ‘colonial ideology’ inherent in the modernisation approach (see 
Thomas, 1999; Pahuja, 2011). 
 
In its economic analysis, modernisation theory emphasised institutional order and assumed 
that underdeveloped countries would follow a similar path to that of developed capitalist 
ones (Snyder, 1980).8 In contrast to these orthodox economic approaches, more heterodox 
economic thinking, in the form of structuralist and import substitution industrialisation 
models of development, contend that the uneven terms of trade between the global North 
and the global South have hindered the development of the latter. Indeed, the Prebisch-
Singer hypothesis goes so far as to suggest that the economic, productive and labour market 
structures of the developed ‘centre’ and of the less developed ‘periphery’ countries differ so 
greatly that free trade can actually be harmful to the latter (Cypher and Dietz, 2008: 175; 
Prebisch, 1962; Singer, 1950). Emerging from, yet offering a critique of structuralism, in 
particular, the structuralism of the United Nations Economic Commission on Latin America 
under Prebisch, dependency theory built on the notion of uneven terms of trade between the 
centre and the periphery - but did so more overtly in terms of a critique of imperialism. 
Whilst there may be ‘no such thing as a single unified body of thought called dependency 
theory’ (Harding, 1976), nevertheless a core concern of this approach is that if some countries 
today are underdeveloped, it is arguably due to the operation of predatory capitalism in its 
colonial and postcolonial (more accurately, perhaps, neocolonial) forms. As Bernstein (1979: 
83) puts it: 
 
The countries of the Third World were actively underdeveloped in the process of the 
emergence and consolidation of capitalism as a world system. The original centres of 
capitalism established their wealth and their power through incorporating and exploiting 
other parts of the world. The primary accumulation of capital in the metropoles or centre 
was fed through a drain of wealth from the satellite or peripheral countries, typically 
involving their colonization, a ‘surplus drain’ which continues to the present day even if its 
forms may have changed, and direct colonial rule is no longer a necessary condition of this 
process.9 
 
Historically, African economies have been deeply integrated into the global economy; but the 
terms of that integration have been highly unfavourable to say the least (Hendrickson, 2012: 
40). Neo-Marxist and related ‘world systems theory’ adapt dependency approaches to further 
challenge the assumptions of ‘modernisation’. In particular, they question the view that the 
less developed countries could follow the same path to development as the highly 
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industrialised ones, by reconceiving the primary unit of analysis as the capitalist world 
economy, seeing the world as divided into core, semi-periphery and periphery (Petras, 1981; 
Amin, 1976; Wallerstein, 1974). Accordingly, ‘catch-up’ by less developed countries is 
impossible given that relations within the world capitalist system are marked by an ‘unequal 
exchange’ involving the transfer of surplus value from the periphery to countries in the core 
through ‘the extension of the capitalist market at the expense of pre-capitalist systems’ 
(Bieler and Morton, 2014: 40). Thus, these heterodox theories of development suggest that 
the exploitation of many Third World/global South countries by colonial and neocolonial 
core countries continued if not intensified following their achievement of political 
independence (Conway and Heynen, 2014: 113). The theory of economic surplus developed 
by Baran (1957) is particularly significant for the light it potentially casts on the 
contemporary economic order of trade liberalisation and ‘free trade’. Baran argued that the 
effects of Western European capitalist penetration of the outside world resulted, in Latin 
America, Africa and Asia, ‘in outright plunder or in plunder thinly veiled as trade, seizing and 
removing tremendous wealth from the places of their penetrations’. Such intercontinental 
resource flows fed the industrial revolution in Europe, whilst leaving the ‘donor’ countries 
systematically underdeveloped (Baran, 1957; Foster, 2007). Thus, according to Baran, the 
reason for the poverty of less developed countries was not lack of capital or expertise or 
excess population as economic orthodoxy would have it; rather, the source of their poverty 
was to be found in the extraction by the core of this ‘surplus’ - defined as the mass of 
resources (actual or potential) which a society could have at its disposal to be reinvested in 
productive ways to facilitate growth (Cypher and Dietz, 2008: 190-1). 
 
Such drain on colonial and postcolonial countries is arguably exacerbated by the formation of 
‘rules of the game’ of the global economic order. As Thomas (1999: 4) puts it, ‘the legal rules 
of the international economic order, though informed by liberal ideals of egalitarianism, 
perpetuate Northern economic hegemony by failing to address the entrenched economic 
inequality of the South resulting from the colonial era’. The ‘unequal exchange’ is marked by 
the transfer of surplus value from the ‘periphery’ to the ‘core’, and also by the extension of the 
capitalist market at the expense of pre-capitalist systems (Bieler and Morton, 2014). 
Arguably therefore, the ‘embedded liberalism’ which underpinned the redistributive 
capacities of individual states of the North and the redistributive capacities of the EU 
integration project was predicated on the transfer of value from the global South. The pattern 
of exchange between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’, the extraction of raw commodities from 
the South, and the commodification of the labour power of colonial states made possible the 
redistributive welfare state of the global North (Blackett, 2007; Polanyi, 1944). 
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RETHINKING THE STATE-MARKET DICHOTOMY THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENTAL 
STATE 
 
In what institutional structures can the postcolonial economy be embedded? I want to 
explore two possible answers: at the level of the individual state, and at the level of the 
region. One example of societal self-protection akin to welfare states in the industrialised 
North is the evolution (and subsequent decline) of the postcolonial ‘developmental state’, 
based on state-led industrialisation behind protectionist barriers. The concept of the 
developmental state contains something of a contradiction in that the very notion of the 
developmental state presupposes one path or route to economic growth and development, 
whilst the literature is highly diverse in identifying a multiplicity of conditions or 
prerequisites for the emergence of the developmental state (Routley, 2012: 14).10 This tension 
may in part be explained by the fact that scholarly observers of developmental states tend not 
to advocate ‘mono-causal’ explanations, and indeed, much of the focus is on the interaction 
between conditions (Routley, 2012: 15). For instance, Fine and others (Fine and Stoneman, 
1996: 14-15; Fine, 2013) characterise the literature on state and development as falling into 
two schools or approaches. The economic school takes ‘market failure’ as its starting point to 
justify state intervention in order to ensure, for instance, requisite economies of scale or 
coordination of investment within and across sectors to support economic growth (Fine, 
2013: 4). This approach typically leaves unanswered the question of the political capacity of 
the state to identify and implement policies which can correct for market failure (Fine and 
Stoneman, 1996: 15). Thus, the political school seeks to fill that gap through a focus on the 
nature of the state itself and whether it has the potential and the independence to adopt the 
necessary developmental policies – ‘remarkably aloof from consideration of the economy 
itself and the nature of the policies required to bring about development’ (Fine, 2013: 4). 
 
What both schools have in common though, and what the paradigm of the developmental 
state model offers most distinctively, is departure from both modernisation theory and 
dependency theory (Fine and Stoneman, 1996: 18) and latterly, a departure from 
neoliberalism. This is evidenced in the regions with which the developmental state paradigm 
is most closely associated: with east Asian countries which enjoyed latecomer catch-up 
industrialisation. For example, Chalmers Johnson’s key initial study of Japan (1982) focused 
on its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the rigid control over the 
private sector by bureaucratic government elites. Similarly, Taiwan and South Korea are held 
up as examples of ‘governing the market’ (Wade, 1990) that is, of substantial state 
intervention into or against the market. What was also central to early instantiations of the 
developmental state paradigm was the contrast drawn between ‘state’ and ‘market’, an 
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arguably false dichotomy (Fine and Stoneman, 1996: 19). Certainly, though, there was a 
rejection of the market fundamentalism of international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. As Routley (2012: 4) puts it: 
 
This emphasis on the significant role of the state in successfully achieving economic 
growth conflicts with the neo-liberal market focused assumptions about how to promote 
development that many development actors had been working with. Rather than seeing 
the state as the agent which could act to produce growth, these neo-liberal approaches saw 
the state as part of the problem and pushed to reduce its size and influence in order for 
development to take off. 
 
In other words, the developmental state paradigm is a challenge to, and challenged by, 
neoliberal developmentalism. The pressure to liberalise and open up national markets 
arguably limits the ‘development space’ available to states (Wade, 2003), constraining the 
scope to adopt the sort of ‘protectionist and nationalistic’ approach adopted by 
developmental states in the past (Routley, 2012: 28). But the developmental state idea or 
paradigm should not just be used as a proxy for state intervention. 
 
Musamba (2010) reviews the defining features of the developmental state concept with 
reference to the experiences of East Asian countries. She seeks to challenge the view that the 
developmental state approach is not viable in Africa, critiquing the ‘impossibility theorem’, 
which is sceptical as to whether the East Asian development experiences can serve as a model 
for Africa (Musamba, 2010: 30). This ‘impossibility theorem’ has been adopted in particular 
by the international financial institutions especially the World Bank (1993) but, as 
Mkandawire and others (Mkandawire 2001 and 2004) have suggested, this approach is 
‘characterized more by an ideological preference of the market approach to development 
rather than a careful analysis of the role of the state in development’ (Musamba, 2010: 30). 
 
The debate about the applicability of the East Asian model in other contexts, in particular in 
Africa, is in part located, as Chang (2006: 30) argues, in the neoliberal distinction between 
markets, which are seen as ‘natural’ endowments which can be transplanted from one region 
to another, and institutions (such as modern bureaucracy), which are seen as man-made and 






THE SCOPE FOR SOCIAL REGIONALISM WITHIN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
 
I want to turn now to this question of the ability of institutions to protect from the market, in 
the context of regions and regionalism. Developing states lack the policy space, institutional 
or economic capacity to moderate the harmful domestic effects of market exposure.  In 
addition, their economies are characterised by high levels of informalisation, in labour and 
other markets (Heintz and Pollin, 2003). It is highly problematic to expect individual states 
within, for example, sub-Saharan Africa to be the only, or main, source of their own (social) 
adjustment (Blackett, 2007). My question then becomes, if not the state, what of the region? 
If there is no ‘social state’ within which to embed liberalism, what is the potential of regional 
integration as a response to globalisation (Van Langenhove and Scaramagli, 2011)? As 
witnessed in the case of the EU, regional integration, with its removal of barriers to trade 
between states, can be a cause of, or an exacerbating factor in, undermining the autonomy of 
the state to operate systems of social protection. But equally, regional integration offers a 
potential solution or potential counter-weight to open markets. 
 
The point I want to make about the value of the region is that, in the past, and in the case of 
the EU, it was able to serve as a complement and even a bolster to the social state. The 
regulatory response to markets, which Polanyi predicts, occurs at the regional or 
supranational level rather than solely at the national level. To what extent can the work done 
by the concept of embeddedness and the experience of social regionalism in the global North 
have resonance in the global South, given that the two conditions outlined above do not 
apply? First, the terms of global trade are less sympathetic towards government intervention; 
second, the individual states are less able to provide social stabilisers. 
 
Examination of a number of features of the design of continent-wide regional integration - 
the African Union and sub-regional integration through the eight regional economic 
communities (RECs) which are recognised by the African Union - reveals a series of key 
external and internal constraints.11 As will be explored below, internal constraints relate to 
the institutional design of regional integration in Africa and the different models of 
integration and regionalism the AU and its member states might be said to be adopting. 
Externally, attempts at regional economic integration are undermined in general by the 
broad context of the global trading regime (the ‘rules of the game’ of the global economic 
order), unequal exchange, and also by cross-cutting bilateral trade agreements. 
 
Unfettered intra-region trade poses myriad challenges, as does the broader liberalisation of 
global trade. The developing countries of the African continent have, in addition, also had to 
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contend with the social dislocations caused by European trade policies, and intrusions into 
their sovereign status resulting from the institutional design of the global trade regime. As 
noted, postcolonial states never enjoyed protective capacities equal to those of ‘the core’. 
These disparities were exacerbated by neoliberal policies of structural adjustment from the 
1970s onwards. But long before such interventions, global economic inequalities were 
entrenched through the continuation of colonial preferences even after the formal end of 
empire, as discussed above, through the persistence of a pattern of exchange (or 
unidirectional trade) between the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’. As Polanyi (1944: 192) noted: 
 
‘But if the organized states of Europe could protect themselves against the backwash of 
international free trade, the politically unorganized colonial peoples could not. The revolt 
against imperialism was mainly an attempt on the part of [colonial] peoples to achieve the 
political status necessary to shelter themselves from the social dislocations caused by 
European trade policies. The protection that the [Europeans] could easily secure for 
[themselves], through the sovereign status of [their] communities was out of reach of [the 
colonized] as long as [they] lacked the prerequisite, political government.’ 
 
For example, the EU’s economic model potentially destabilises the development of regional 
integration in its developing country trading partners. It also potentially destabilises 
redistributive social institutions, or region-specific adjustment mechanisms within 
industrialising states with which it trades. For instance, the mechanism for regional 
redistribution of customs duties between the five members of the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU; Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) has been severely 
undermined, in general, by the lowering of external trade tariffs in the context of global trade 
liberalisation, and in particular, by a reciprocal trade agreement negotiated between South 
Africa and the EU. This EU-South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement,12 
has arguably led to a reduction in revenues for all SACU states as the EU accounts for 40% of 
SACU imports. Certainly, the common tariff revenue pool has been reduced, with Swaziland 
and Lesotho losing out in particular, as 50 percent of their fiscal revenues come from this 
tariff revenue pool (Assarson, 2005). 
 
More generally, the likely adjustment costs for African states of the move to full reciprocity in 
international trade will be severe. EU trade with the group of 77 African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) states has been marked by the core principle of non-reciprocal trade 
preferences first enshrined in the Lomé Convention of 1975 (Bartels, 2007), which has meant 
the ACP countries were under no obligation to offer reciprocal market access to the EU, 
except for treatment no less favourable than that offered to other non-developing countries 
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(Bartels, 2007: 734). However, such preferential treatment of products from ACP states is 
steadily disappearing as these bilateral trade agreements are progressively made WTO-
compatible. The reliance on tariff revenues coupled with the prominence of EU imports into 
the African continent means that the required tariff dismantlement will lead to acute 
shortfalls in revenue (African Trade Policy Centre, 2005). 
 
But there are internal constraints too.  The relative success of the social regionalism which 
has occurred within the EU is because the constituent member states of the EU had domestic 
social and welfare systems – a social state - which were able to fund social policy 
interventions. But in addition, supranational decision-making was undoubtedly an important 
prerequisite for the development of the European social model (Ashiagbor, 2013). In 
contrast, the reluctance of developing and/or newly postcolonial states to constrain their 
sovereignty through supranational (as opposed to intergovernmental) decision-making may 
limit regional integration, and the development of the social dimension of that integration. 
 
Having acquired political autonomy and statehood relatively recently and facing constraints 
on policy action from outside their borders, individual states are unwilling to cede norm-
making power to a central or supranational body. Integration arrangements within regional 
economic communities across Africa are thus normatively loose, tending towards what one 
might call decisional intergovernmentalism.13 But perhaps a better view of the ‘looseness’ of 
these institutional arrangements is that they are designed to be flexible regimes of 
cooperation, precisely in order to better suit the multiple policy objectives of the African 
context and to allow for greater state sovereignty (Gathii, 2010). Second, the multiplicity of 
regional economic communities, and their overlapping ‘mandates, objectives, protocols, and 
functions’ (UNECA, 2006: 110) further inhibit the development of spheres of policy influence 
at the regional level that are able to direct or influence national policy. The multiple 
overlapping memberships complicate regional governance (UNU-CRIS, 2008; Brosig, 2011) 
one outcome of which is weak regional support for emergent national institutions of social 
citizenship, in part due to the lack of institutional arrangements to attract either 
international or intra-regional transfers (Yeates and Deacon, 2009: 29). 
 
The institutional design of regional economic integration within Africa, namely, which 
models of governance the AU and its member states are adopting, thus limits the possibilities 
for regionalisation and the social dimension of that integration. It arguably remains unclear 
which model of integration and continental governance the AU and its member states are 
adopting; or rather, the models which are being pursued are pulling in competing directions. 
Laporte and Mackie (2010: 13) contend that it ‘remains an open question whether African 
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leaders will ultimately make a clear choice for a supra-national or an inter-governmental type 
of institution’. However, a better view is that it is inappropriate to allow EU-style 
institutionalism (and sovereignty pooling) to shape perceptions about how regionalism 
should look (Söderbaum, 2012: 51). Indeed, the Constitutive Act of the African Union which 
came into force in 2001 and brought the AU into being by replacing the Charter of the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) should be read as a compromise between advocates of a 
federal union with supranational decision-making, and those unwilling to concede national 
sovereignty. The persistence of fragile states and weak resource bases generates ambivalence 
towards deep forms of regional integration and the pooling of sovereignty. Söderbaum puts it 
more bluntly, that ‘weak states tend to place heavy emphasis on formal and absolute 
sovereignty’ (2004: 426). 
 
For Gathii (2010), the spaghetti bowl of overlapping regional economic communities is no 
bad thing if it reflects, as he would argue, a desire on the part of these nation states to retain 
national sovereignty rather than be enveloped within an inexorable move towards closer, 
tighter, more supranational forms of integration. His argument is that it suits post-colonial 
sub-Saharan African states to enter into these looser regional arrangements, and not to 
aspire to the form of economic integration, with binding centrally-determined norms, that 
have characterised European regional integration (Ashiagbor, 2014). 
 
But allied to this model of integration (adopted primarily by the heads of state and 
governments of AU states), is the approach to markets being adopted within the AU and its 
regional economic communities (advocated in particular by the technocrat elite within the 
institutions of the AU and RECs), a market orientation which, following the neoliberal turn, 
as the dominant mode. My conclusions, in particular in light of interviews with AU 
Commission officials, are that this emphasis on intergovernmentalism, together with the 
existence of a multiplicity of regional economic communities with overlapping memberships, 
determines the structure of regional governance and arguably undermines potential for 
emergent trade adjustment mechanisms. The second observation relates to the market-
oriented approach of the AU and the RECs: there is an observable shift away from earlier 
forms of integration based on protectionism, towards the neoliberal trade liberalisation 
paradigm. Whereas, it could be argued, the aims of the original wave of regional integration 
projects of the 1960s and 1970s had at their core the evolution of the postcolonial 
developmental state, concerned with reducing North-South dependence; the wave of 
regionalism since the 1990s has in contrast been more focused on the objective of integrating 
these developing economies more closely into global markets (Olivet and Brennan, 2009: 
67), even though the terms of such integration remain uneven. There has been a shift, within 
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the continent of Africa, away from an earlier form of integration based on protectionism, 
towards the neoliberal trade liberalisation paradigm. Accordingly, Olivet and Brennan 





This article has sought to examine cross-national market integration projects, namely the 
European Union and the African Union, by applying insights of economic sociology of law to 
industrialised and developing economies and regions. It contends that there is real value in 
the approach offered by economic sociology of law: that is, the use of sociological approaches 
(empirical, normative, analytical) to investigate relationships between (social and labour) law 
and economy. The approach allowed us to interrogate understandings of the interaction 
between law, economy and society which inform the economic development process as 
witnessed, for instance, in the experimentation with the developmental state and neoliberal 
developmentalist paradigms. The economic sociology of law approach also illuminates the 
role of state action, including in the context of regional integration, and the differential 
capacities of the state the North and the South to steer, govern or embed the market. 
 
Writing in a paper entitled, ‘Universal Capitalism or Regional Planning?’ Polanyi cautioned 
that ‘regionalism is not a panacea’ (1945: 89). Whilst regional cooperation has the potential 
to contribute to a more equitable pattern of globalisation, nonetheless, the question remains: 
in what form of regionalism will the postcolonial state be located, and in what institutional 
structures are these nascent forms of market integration to be embedded? Challenges posed 
to the sustainability of European welfare states have led to a retrenchment of these social 
protective elements, and an unravelling of that embedded liberal bargain (Ashiagbor, 2013; 
Vis et al, 2011). In industrialising states, in contrast, it is necessary to explore political and 
economic constraints on regional integration which frustrate what could well be a genuine 
‘counter-movement’ to ameliorate the fundamentalism of the market. Undoubtedly, the 
active role of the developmental state in stimulating and directing economic growth has been 
challenged by the neoliberal turn in the international economic order and the dominance of 
the Washington Consensus. It is clear that a societal response at the regional level may well 
be muted if priority is given to market governance in order to secure entry into the global 
trade regime. How then, in the newer waves of regional economic integration in the global 
south, can the shift away from the explicitly protectionist developmental nation state, 





1  As I have explored elsewhere (Ashiagbor, 2013) the concept of embeddedness is not very well 
defined within Polanyi’s major work, The Great Transformation, and, as Krippner et al point out 
(2004: 109-110), there are ‘clear tensions between Polanyi’s initial use of the concept and its use 
today’. See also Dale, 2011. 
2  As examples of which he includes trade union and anti-trust legislation, as well as legislation 
relating to public health, factory conditions, workmen’s compensation, municipal trading, social 
insurance, public utilities and trade associations. 
3  The following draws on Ashiagbor, 2013. A third conceptualisation of embeddedness is that offered 
by Granovetter (1985), who argues that orthodox neoclassical economic accounts provide an 
‘undersocialized’ account of economic action, whilst sociology offers an ‘oversocialized’ conception; 
whereas in fact, he posits, most economic behaviour is closely embedded in networks of 
interpersonal relations. However, this interpretation of embeddedness, focussing on network 
structures, has been criticised for leaving ‘intact the notion of an analytically autonomous economy 
criticized forcefully by Polanyi’: Krippner and Alvarez, 2007. Granovetter himself later observed ‘I 
use the term “embeddedness” [in the 1985 article] in a narrower and somewhat different way than 
Polanyi meant it’: Krippner, Granovetter et al, 2004: 113. 
4  There are five European structural and investment funds: the European regional development 
fund, the European social fund, the Cohesion fund, the European agricultural fund for rural 
development, the European maritime and fisheries fund. http://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-
tenders/european-structural-and-investment-funds_en. Structural funds are allocated to regions 
of the EU depending on GDP per capita; regions with less than 75% of the EU average are 
designated as ‘less developed’ and receive 52% of total spending. The ‘less developed’ regions are 
concentrated in Eastern Europe, particularly those former communist countries that have joined 
the EU since 2004, though parts of Greece, Portugal, the south of Italy and Spain are also included; 
they also include West Wales and the Welsh Valleys, Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly. The UK is 
therefore unusual among northern European countries in having any ‘less developed’ regions. See 
Browne et al (2016). 
5  Or rather, the economic constitution which was always the core of the EU project is now serving to 
undermine the capacity of Member States to maintain certain social models, especially corporatist 
forms, at national level. See Ashiagbor (2013). 
6  In mapping the history of development thinking, Hettne (1990: 39) argues that ‘development’ 
entails: development theories, development strategies and development ideologies – all of which 
are highly contested. 
7  Thomas, 2006: 423. 
8  Early ‘law and development’ scholarship, or rather, the dominant liberal legalist paradigm critiqued 
by Trubek and Galanter can be seen as the legal counterpart of modernisation theory (Trubek and 
Galanter, 1974) in that law and development scholars ‘relied heavily, if not exclusively, upon 
modernization theory for their presuppositions and theoretical frameworks’ (Snyder, 1980: 731). 
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9  See also Frank 1966: contemporary underdevelopment can be understood not as a product of that 
country’s own economic, political, social, cultural characteristics, but in large part ‘the historical 
product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped 
and the now developed metropolitan countries’. 
10  ‘Of course, the diversity of these accounts is indicative of the lack of consensus in the literature on 
the key aspects of the routes that states have taken to become developmental, but it may equally 
reflect the variety of routes states have taken’. 
11  The eight RECs recognised by the African Union are: the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA); the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CEN-SAD); the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)2; and the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). 
12  See, for example, 2004/441/EC: Council Decision of 26 April 2004 concerning the conclusion of 
the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement between the European Community and its 
Member States, on the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, on the other part, O.J. L 127, 109 
(Apr. 29 2004); Deacon, 2001: 18. Further, on 10 June 2016, the EU and six countries of the SADC 
EPA Group –Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland (BLNS), South Africa and Mozambique – 
signed an EPA, the first of its kind between the EU and an African region pursuing the objective of 
economic integration. See Assarson, 2005. 
13  For discussion of a contrasting approach, the slow turn to a form of ‘decisional supranationalism’ 
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